Last year Sally Ledger asked me to speak on the differences between British and American criticism of Victorian literature and culture at a meeting that brought together research centres for Victorian and Nineteenth-Century studies in the UK in anticipation of the first joint meeting of the British and North American Victorian Studies Associations in the summer of 2009. It takes some temerity to do this in the twenty minutes I was allotted on this occasion.
Her interest is in making this history vivid again, and in making good her claim by showing how popular radical traditions and allusions to these are at work in the texts. Her splendid chapter on the use of political show trials in the Regency and allusions to them in the novels is an example of her method. Moments we have hardly noticed as political allusion stand out:
Pickwick's breach of promise trial, with its allusions to the absurdly scanty evidence of Caroline Norton's adultery, resonate in Buzfuz's use of Pickwick's note about 'chops and tomata sauce'; other more sinister references in Bleak House (1852-3) and Great Expectations (1860-1) also emerge. Ledger feels no need to counter sceptical readings of Dickens the man's personal politics. What she is interested in is an impersonal history that is demonstrably there, both empirically and in the novels, as a structure of feeling and as fact.
So what comes out is a strong, affirmative reading -and repeated political insights.
Rosemarie Bodenheimer and Ledger complement one another. For the difficult history that interests Bodenheimer is precisely what Dickens can be said to have known, an
epistemological issue that Ledger sets aside. Her title, Knowing Dickens, puns on our capacity to know what he knows and the extent of his own knowing. The paradox of Dickens, the coexistence of extraordinarily sophisticated insights and the simplicities of farce and melodrama and sentiment, of subtlety and crudity, is where her meticulous book starts from. She concludes that Dickens was able strategically both to know and to ignore what he knew.
But the problem of knowing carries over into the novels themselves. Thus, as in her study of George Eliot, the psychic biography that interests her is not sequential. The book is arranged thematically with chapters on 'Memory', 'Another Man' (the double), 'Streets', for example, that explore how events, traumas, passions in Dickens's life are reshaped and modulated in the action and language of the fiction. There is no simple explanatory transition from life to text, but a wonderfully concrete demonstration of the way anxieties, contradictions and repressions reappear as further problems in the novels. She is hard on Dickens's anxious class mobility, for instance, and in the 'Memory' chapter shows how consistently Dickens avoided writing about children who work in 'nondomestic jobs for regular wages', as he did himself in the trauma of the blacking warehouse: this even to the extent of an ignominious evasion of instance -only as second-order signs that the rubric of epic is being fulfilled, and puts them to the new uses, the exploration of a myth of development and progress in its best and worst senses.
Dentith's much leaner book is also interested in the epic as bearer of and witness to the idea of nation. He understands epic more widely that Tucker, glossing the later period by dynamic is given up to the determinism of the 'code that is the tale' (E, 518), resisting a myth of progress. While Tucker is interested in the politics of form, the form history is given in the epic, Dentith is sharply interested in the way people think about history and society.
Kirstie Blair and Cornelia Pearsall are both historicists, but here I will take up the different ways they attend to the circulation of affect. For Blair this circulation is literal. Her first long chapter charts in detail Victorian medical researches into the physiology and pathology of the heart, an interest that new technologies, such as the invention of the stethoscope, made increasingly exact. A cardiac terminology -the circulation of the blood, the flow, the valve, the beat, the pulse, the throb -connected with disorders of the nervous system, with the passions, and with affect, hovers between a literal physiological meaning and a metaphorical or psychological one. The idea of the heart reaches out from the individual body to the body politic, where the transmission of affect is crucial to sickness and health.
Victorian prosodists, inflecting rhythmic theory with the pulse of the heart, based theories of understanding of intentionality and performativity, utterances that perform acts, she argues that suasive, 'efficacious language' is both the substance and the goal of the monologue, which aims to transform its interlocutor and us and on many occasions the speaker himself. 5 Thus the monologue is an event that takes place in the real 'time of its utterance' that performs the rapture it describes and is the imitation of a speech act or a performance of performativity (TR, 337). As she writes elsewhere, the monologue aims to 'dramatize, as well as to cause, performative effects'. 6 The speaker is an intentional being in a way that theories of the monologue usually deny, concentrating as they do on ironies of failed communication But I am aware that the tendentious generalisation is too much an inherent part of the kind of analysis I have been asked to make. It is a cause for rejoicing that so much excellent criticism of Victorian writing has arrived from both sides of the Atlantic recently, a cause for rejoicing that there is so much interchange between critics in Britain and America. Victorian criticism has always been the laboratory of theory and methodology. The books reviewed here suggest that it continues to be so.
